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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 13-4724 
______________ 
 
JEAN COLEMAN; DAVID COLEMAN, Guardians;  
RODNEY JONES, Student 
 Appellants 
 
v. 
 
POTTSTOWN SCHOOL DISTRICT 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2-10-cv-07421) 
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 12, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  September 15, 2014) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Jean Coleman, David Coleman, and R.J. (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal the 
 2 
 
portion of the District Court’s judgment affirming the state administrative agency’s 
(“Hearing Officer’s”) determination that the Pottstown School District (“School 
District”) provided R.J. with a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”).  Because 
of the governing standard of review, we are constrained to affirm.   
I 
As we write principally for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the essential 
facts and procedural history.  R.J. attended public school in Baltimore but moved to the 
School District in 2006 shortly before entering tenth grade.  Using R.J.’s school records 
from Baltimore (“Baltimore Records”) and his performance during the first month of 
tenth grade, the School District created an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) to 
address R.J.’s learning disability as required by the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (“IDEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.1  This IEP (“2006 IEP”) documented 
that R.J. was receiving passing grades in special education classes but that on two reading 
probes he performed at a 1.5 grade level with a base of 64 words correct per minute and 
2.0 grade level with a base of 47 words correct per minute.  The 2006 IEP identified 
reading fluency, written expression skills, math calculation, and math reasoning as R.J.’s 
areas of need and provided a single “measurable annual goal” for reading, writing, and 
                                                 
1
 R.J. had been diagnosed with reactive attachment disorder, dysthymia, post-
traumatic stress disorder (likely resulting from the death of his brother and incarceration 
of a parent), traumatic brain injury, and obsessive compulsive personality disorder.  The 
Baltimore Records showed he also had problems with inattention, aggression, atypicality, 
and withdrawal, and suggested that he met the criterion for attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder.   
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math, setting a grade level that R.J. was to achieve in each subject by the end of the 
school year.  App. 178-80.  The 2006 IEP also included a number of specially-designed 
instructions (“SDIs”) that a neuropsychological evaluation performed in Baltimore had 
recommended for R.J., including a small classroom setting, cues to remain on task, extra 
time to complete tests, repeated directions, reading directions out loud, and dictation to a 
scribe.
2
  The 2006 IEP also recommended a speech and language evaluation and provided 
for one-on-one reading instruction with a special education teacher trained in the 
Lindamood-Bell instructional method.  The 2006 IEP also included a “Behavior 
Improvement Plan” that appeared to be a generic form on which R.J.’s name was 
handwritten.  App. 185.  Recognizing that R.J. was “at risk for emotional problems” and 
exhibited behaviors that impeded his learning or that of others, the 2006 IEP provided 
him with thirty minutes of counseling each week and stated that a functional behavioral 
assessment (“FBA”) would be done if behavioral problems arose.3  App. 174.   
During the 2006-07 school year, R.J. exhibited disruptive behavior
4
 but the School 
                                                 
2
 The neuropsychological evaluation recommended additional SDIs that were not 
contained in the 2006 IEP, including instruction in coping, problem-solving, 
organization, self-monitoring, and cognitive flexibility, as well as books on tape.  The 
2006 IEP also omitted the evaluation’s recommended executive function aids, including 
watching for signs of inattention or problems with auditory processing, asking R.J. to 
repeat information to ensure his understanding, assisting R.J. with organizing his work 
into a binder, providing frequent breaks, and linking new learning with his interests. 
3
 “An FBA is a process for getting information to understand the function or 
purpose of behavior in order to develop an effective intervention plan.”  App. 1173. 
4
 He was argumentative, talked excessively in class, and used inappropriate 
language.  His behavior deteriorated in the Fall of 2007.    
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District determined it was not severe enough to warrant anything beyond counseling as 
he was producing passing work.  Moreover, the School District did not perform an FBA 
because it believed R.J. was acting out because he missed his family in Baltimore.  
Instead, the School District referred R.J. to the Student Assistance Program, which 
provided counseling and therapy outside of the school setting.
5
   
In March 2007, R.J. was being instructed in reading at a second grade level and 
was receiving passing grades in his special education classes.  Appellants, through their 
son, Michael Coleman, contacted the School District out of concern that R.J. was not 
making enough progress in reading.  The School District then performed a speech and 
language screening, which did not reveal a need for further evaluation.  By May 2007, 
R.J.’s reading fluency had improved to a second or third grade level with an increase of 
37.5 words correct per minute.   
In October 2007, the School District prepared another IEP (“2007 IEP”) for R.J.  
The 2007 IEP was largely the same as the 2006 IEP but had a few material differences.  
First, the 2007 IEP showed that R.J. received low yet passing grades in his special 
education classes for reading, science, social studies, math and economics.  Second, it no 
longer contained an annual measurable goal for writing, and, while the goals for reading 
and math increased by one grade level, the School District did not completely fill in the 
                                                 
5
 The outcome of the referral is not part of the record.   
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math goal.
6
  Third, in addition to the SDIs listed in the 2006 IEP, the 2007 IEP directed 
that teachers seat R.J. near the area of instruction, reduce the quantity of written in-class 
work and tests, and permit use of a calculator.  Finally, the 2007 IEP maintained that R.J. 
was “at risk for emotional problems” and provided for thirty minutes of counseling per 
week, but did not direct that an FBA be performed.  App. 203.    
On May 8, 2008, the School District evaluated R.J.’s literacy skills using 
standardized tests that showed that his scores fell in the kindergarten to first grade range 
for letter-word identification, passage comprehension, and writing samples, and the 
fourth grade range for applied problems and word attack.  The School District’s reading 
probes also showed that his progress in reading fluency had slowed, but he maintained 
scores in the third grade level and increased by ten the number of words read per minute.   
Ten days later, Appellants had R.J. evaluated by a private center (“Center”) that 
provided reading instruction using the Lindamood-Bell method.  The evaluation showed 
that his reading ability was between a 1.8 and 3.5 grade level depending on the test 
administered.  R.J. withdrew from the School District and, in September 2008, enrolled at 
the Center at Appellants’ expense.  He received reading and language instruction only 
and made significant progress.  By May 2009, R.J.’s word attack skills had increased 
from a 1.8 to 7.5 grade level, his sight word assessment had increased from a 3.1 to 7.3 
grade level, and his oral reading fluency had increased from a 3.2 to 6.0 grade level.     
                                                 
6
 The goal stated that “[w]hen given a 4.0 5.0 grade level math computation probe, 
Rodney will have a goal of ____ dcpm on 3 consecutive probes.”  App. 207. 
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On May 13, 2009, Appellants filed an administrative due process complaint 
against the School District, alleging that it denied R.J. a FAPE.
7
  After conducting a 
hearing, the Hearing Officer determined that the School District did not deny R.J. a 
FAPE.     
Appellants appealed to the District Court, alleging violations of the IDEA, the 
Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and seeking relief in the form of compensatory 
education and tuition reimbursement.  The District Court permitted Appellants to 
supplement the administrative record with (1) behavioral and disciplinary records; (2) 
R.J.’s work product; and (3) a report by Appellants’ expert, Dr. Nancy Bloomfield.  Dr. 
Bloomfield opined that R.J.’s IEPs were “among the most inadequate [she] ha[d] ever 
reviewed” and should have included additional goals for decoding, reading 
comprehension, writing, and math.  App. 1178.  She asserted that the School District’s 
SDIs were “pro forma” and that it should have provided additional SDIs, such as 
audiobooks or text-to-speech software.  App. 1177-78.  She viewed his placement in a 
number of classes as a “great disservice” and that it would have been “reasonable to 
                                                 
7
 “A parent who believes that a school has failed to provide a FAPE may request a 
hearing, commonly known as a due process hearing.”  Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 575 
F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir. 2009).  In Pennsylvania, the hearing is conducted by a Hearing 
Officer, Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 527 (3d Cir. 1995), and the burden of 
proof is on the party seeking relief, Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 
(2005).  A party aggrieved by the Hearing Officer’s decision may file an appeal in federal 
district court.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A); see also 22 Pa. Code § 14.162(o). 
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provide a much more intensive intervention program like Lindamood Bell.”  App. 1177.  
Dr. Bloomfield opined that R.J. would benefit from one-on-one education outside a 
setting that triggers his “emotional and behavioral resistance to learning,” and that an 
FBA and additional therapy sessions would allow him to learn more appropriate 
behaviors and coping skills.  App. 1175.   
Dr. Samuel Brooks testified on behalf of the School District.  Dr. Brooks 
explained that R.J. received special education instruction in small classes for reading, 
math, science, and writing and was found to have made progress based on his 
performance in class, not the standardized tests relied on by Appellants, which he 
explained are diagnostic and do not monitor progress.  Dr. Brooks also observed that 
R.J.’s behavior did not result in a loss of instructional time and that the School District 
responded with counseling and a referral to the Student Assistance Program.
8
   
The District Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Hearing Officer’s 
decision, concluding that the IDEA’s statute of limitations barred all claims that pre-
                                                 
8
 Aside from Drs. Brooks and Bloomfield, the District Court heard testimony from 
Michael Coleman and had the transcripts from the administrative hearing embodying 
testimony from (1) the School District’s Supervisor of Secondary Special Education, who 
testified about creating R.J.’s IEPs and her discussions with Michael Coleman about R.J. 
attending the Center; (2) a special education teacher at the School District, who testified 
about her experience teaching R.J. math and writing during his tenth grade year; (3) a 
special education teacher at the School District, who testified about creating R.J.’s IEPs, 
her training and experience teaching R.J. in the Lindamood-Bell instructional method, 
and R.J.’s progress; (4) the Director of the Center, who testified about its educational 
program and R.J.’s progress at the School District and Center; and (5) the Career 
Technical Director at the School District, who testified about transition services at the 
School District.  
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dated May 12, 2007, and that the School District did not thereafter deny R.J. a FAPE.  
Appellants only appeal the District Court’s finding that the School District did not deny 
R.J. a FAPE. 
II
9
 
We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s legal conclusions and review its 
findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard.
10
  D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 
F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2010).  “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, after 
reviewing the evidence, the court of appeals is left with a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed.”  Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 
F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. Of Borough of Clementon 
Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993)).  Thus, even if we may have reached a 
                                                 
9
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1343 and 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2), and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
10
 When reviewing “an appeal from a state administrative decision under the 
IDEA, district courts apply a . . . ‘modified de novo’ review.”  D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of 
Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2010).  Under this standard, a district court must give 
“due weight” to the findings in the administrative proceedings.  Id.  Under the “due 
weight” standard, “[f]actual findings from the administrative proceedings are . . . 
considered prima facie correct.”  P.P. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 734 
(3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  Where the hearing 
officer hears live testimony, a district court must accept “credibility determinations unless 
the non-testimonial, extrinsic evidence in the record would justify a contrary conclusion.”  
Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004) (emphasis 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  Within these confines, “a district court is 
authorized to make findings based on the preponderance of the evidence.”  D.S., 602 F.3d 
at 564. 
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different outcome, we must defer to the District Court’s finding if there is evidence to 
support it. 
III 
 Congress enacted the IDEA to “[i]mprov[e] educational results for children with 
disabilities.”  20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1).  The IDEA requires that states receiving federal 
education funding provide a FAPE to disabled children until they reach 21 years of age.  
Jonathan H. v. Souderton Area Sch. Dist., 562 F.3d 527, 528 (3d Cir. 2009).  A FAPE 
“consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the 
handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to 
benefit from the instruction.”  Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 268-69 (3d Cir. 
2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  The “primary mechanism for 
delivering a FAPE” is the IEP, which must include an assessment of the child’s current 
educational performance, articulate measurable educational goals, and specify the nature 
of special services that the school will provide.  Id. at 269 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1).  
 An IEP must be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational 
benefits.”  Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 575 F.3d 235, 249 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Bd. 
of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1982)).  “Although the IEP must provide the 
student with a ‘basic floor of opportunity,’ it does not have to provide ‘the optimal level 
of services,’ or incorporate every program requested by the child’s parents.”  Ridley, 680 
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F.3d at 269 (internal citations omitted).  Thus, a school district need not “maximize the 
potential of every handicapped child, [but] must supply an education that provides 
‘significant learning’ and ‘meaningful benefit’ to the child.”  Id. (internal citations 
omitted).  “The issue of whether an IEP is appropriate is a question of fact.”  D.S., 602 
F.3d at 564 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).    
 Appellants argue that the District Court erred in finding that the IEPs were 
appropriate because, Appellants contend, they were lacking in several respects.  First, 
they contend that the IEPs failed to adopt each of the SDIs recommended in the 
Baltimore Records and the District Court failed to consider whether the “array of SDIs” 
that were provided to R.J. were tailored to meet his needs.  App. 68.  The District Court 
reviewed the SDIs provided, which included a small classroom setting, cues to remain on 
task, extra time to complete tests, repeated directions, reading directions out loud, 
dictation to a scribe, seating near the instruction area, reduced written class work and 
tests, reduced number of tests or test items, and use of a calculator,
11
 and found they were 
reasonably calculated to provide R.J. with meaningful educational benefit.  While R.J.’s 
improvement at the Center suggests that these SDIs did not provide R.J. with the 
maximum educational benefit, Appellants have failed to demonstrate that these SDIs 
were insufficient to provide R.J. with a “basic floor of opportunity,” which is all that the 
                                                 
11
 The IEPs also adopted other recommendations from the Baltimore Records, 
including counseling, speech and language evaluation, and a phonics approach to reading 
in the Lindamood-Bell style.   
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IDEA requires.  See Ridley, 680 F.3d at 269.  Without evidence that other SDIs were 
needed to provide R.J. with a FAPE, Appellants’ argument regarding the SDIs provided 
is insufficient to disturb the finding that his IEPs were adequate.
12
  See id. 
 Second, Appellants contend that R.J.’s IEPs failed to provide adequate annual 
measurable goals.
13
  While the 2006 IEP provided only three goals—one each for 
reading, writing, and math—his 2007 IEP contained only a reading goal and an 
incomplete math goal.  Affording the District Court the required deference and based 
upon the record presented, we cannot conclude that the District Court erred in finding 
that the School District was not required to create “distinct measurable goals for each 
recognized need of a disabled student to provide a FAPE.” App. 65.  Furthermore, while 
Appellants’ expert opined that the IEPs should have had additional goals, she does not 
explain how the presence of such goals were necessary to ensure R.J. received a FAPE.  
Though the School District certainly could have been more comprehensive, Appellants 
                                                 
12
 Appellants also contend that R.J.’s IEPs failed to address his attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, traumatic brain injury, and executive dysfunction because it did 
not adopt the recommendations from the Baltimore Records that addressed executive 
function, set forth supra footnote 2.  While the education provided to R.J. would certainly 
have been enhanced by the inclusion of these SDIs, Appellants did not provide evidence 
that leaves us with the firm conviction that the District Court erred in determining that 
those SDIs were not necessary to provide R.J. a FAPE.     
13
 Although Appellants claim that deficiencies in an IEP’s goals constitute a 
procedural violation under the IDEA, a challenge to the content of an IEP “is concerned 
with the IEP’s substance” and “does not implicate the IDEA’s procedural requirements.”  
D.S., 602 F.3d at 565.  We therefore treat this argument as a substantive challenge.   
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failed to provide evidence that would permit us to disturb the District Court’s finding that 
the IEPs were adequate. 
 Third, Appellants contend that the District Court erred in holding that R.J. 
received a FAPE based on his progress in reading fluency alone without considering 
R.J.’s lack of progress in other identified areas of need, namely writing and math.  While 
the record is devoid of evidence of R.J.’s progress in math and writing, it does show that 
R.J. received passing grades in his math and writing special education courses.  A court 
may consider a student’s grades, including grades from special education courses, to 
evaluate the appropriateness of an IEP, if the court also considers the adequacy of the 
instruction provided.
14
  D.S., 602 F.3d at 567-68.  As the District Court considered the 
adequacy of R.J.’s education, or more specifically, the absence of evidence that it was 
inadequate, we cannot say that it clearly erred in finding R.J. was not denied a FAPE.  
 Fourth, Appellants contend that R.J. was denied a FAPE due to the School 
District’s failure to address his behavioral needs.  Specifically, they argue that the School 
District should have performed an FBA, provided cognitive behavioral therapy, and 
increased his counseling from thirty minutes per week, particularly as R.J.’s behavior 
                                                 
14
 Courts, however, “should not place conclusive significance on special education 
classroom scores” as “there may be a disconnect between a school’s assessment of a 
student in a special education setting and his achievements in that setting and the 
student’s achievements in standardized testing.”  D.S., 602 F.3d at 568.  Had we 
reviewed this case without the confines of the standard of review, we may have disagreed 
with the weight given to the passing grades R.J. received, particularly since he received 
credit for assignments he completed, regardless of whether they were correct.      
 13 
 
deteriorated.
15
  The District Court found that “[w]hile R.J.’s behavior did appear to 
decline over the course of the two year period such that the school district may have been 
required to take further steps—like conducting an FBA—when creating a new IEP for the 
2008-09 academic year, this issue is moot in light of R.J.’s departure from the [School] 
District at the beginning of the 2008-09 year.”  App. 62-63.  Whether this issue was 
mooted by R.J.’s withdrawal or not, the District Court was presented with facts to support 
the view that an FBA was not required to ensure R.J. received a FAPE.  According to Dr. 
Brooks, an FBA was not warranted as the behavioral issues were understood to stem 
from R.J.’s desire to return to Baltimore.  Moreover, R.J.’s behavioral incidents did not 
result in any lost instructional time.  Thus, we cannot say the District Court clearly erred. 
 Finally, Appellants contend that the District Court failed to account for R.J.’s 
individual potential.  The record, however, shows that the District Court considered the 
Baltimore Records and testimony concerning R.J.’s specific needs and the services to 
address them.  Thus, we cannot say the District Court failed to consider R.J.’s individual 
potential in assessing whether his IEPs were reasonably calculated to provide meaningful 
educational benefit.  See T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 578 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (holding that court adequately considered student’s individual potential where 
it relied on expert testimony that education program would “suit” the student’s needs).  
                                                 
15
 Appellants also argue that the Behavioral Improvement Plan in the IEPs was 
inadequate because it was a generic form not tailored to R.J.’s needs.  Absent a 
demonstration that it impeded R.J. from receiving a FAPE, however, we cannot disturb 
the District Court’s finding.  
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Moreover, although R.J.’s reading improved significantly at the Center, and “evidence of 
a student’s later educational progress may be considered in determining whether the 
original IEP was reasonably calculated to afford some educational benefit,” D.S., 602 
F.3d at 567 (internal quotations marks and alteration omitted), the Center focused only on 
reading.  Furthermore, “the measure and adequacy of an IEP can only be determined as 
of the time it is offered to the student, and not at some later date.”  Fuhrmann v. East 
Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1040 (3d Cir. 1993).  Therefore, because the 
evidence does not contradict the finding that R.J. was provided a FAPE, we are obligated 
to accept it as correct.
16
   
IV 
 Although we affirm the District Court, we commend the compassion the Colemans 
exhibited towards R.J.  Were our inquiry limited to rewarding the generosity of a loving 
family, we would almost certainly reach a different result.  We are obliged, however, to 
apply the governing law, which requires that we affirm. 
                                                 
16
 As we affirm the District Court’s finding that R.J. was not denied a FAPE, the 
IDEA, ADA, and RA claims must fail, D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 253 
n.8 (3d Cir. 2012), and we need not consider whether Appellants are entitled to tuition 
reimbursement, see C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 71 (3d Cir. 2010). 
